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CASE DIGEST

This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that represent current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases that establish legal principles and cases that apply established legal principles to
new factual situations. These cases are grouped in topical categories and
references are given for further research.
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ALIENS: CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION

THE BLANKET

POLICY

OF

DETAINING

ALIEN

CHILDREN

WHO

No ADULT RELATIVE OR LEGAL GUARDIAN TO ASSUME THEIR
CUSTODY PENDING DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS VIOLATES THE FUNHAVE

DAMENTAL RIGHT TO LIBERTY PROTECTED BY THE HABEAS CORPUS
GUARANTEE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

Flores v. Meese,

942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. en banc 1991).
Plaintiffs brought a class action against the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to challenge its policy that required governmental
detention of children during the pendency of deportation proceedings.
The policy, codified at 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1988), required the detention
of children suspected of illegal immigration into the United States, unless
an adult relative or legal guardian could assume custody until the deportation hearings. The INS did not contend that the release of the detained
children would create a threat of harm to the children or to society. The
district court held that a blanket detention policy in these circumstances
is unlawful. It entered an order that required, when feasible, the release
to a responsible party of children who otherwise would have been re-
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leased to a parent or guardian. The order further required an administrative hearing for each child to determine whether, and under what conditions, the child should be released. On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a divided panel reversed the
district court's holding. Following remand, the active judges voted to rehear the case en banc. Held: Majority panel decision vacated and the
district court's order Affirmed.
The first issue involved the detention policy itself; whether it affected
any constitutionally protected liberty interests of the plaintiffs. The defendants suggested the plaintiffs only had a limited liberty interest because of their status as both aliens and children. The court cited Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976), as support for the full application
of the due process protections of the Fifth Amendment to aliens, even if
illegal in status. Accordingly, any person present in the United States
warrants equal justice before the law, including procedural protections
in conjunction with any deprivation of liberty and freedom from invidious discrimination. Furthermore, the court, citing Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), reiterated the well-established principle that
alienage does not prevent a person from testing the legality of confinement through writ of habeas corpus. The court cited Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952), for support to allow the application of
habeas corpus review to detentions that were administrative, rather than
punitive, in nature, much like the present one.
While the court recognized the discretionary nature of INS proceedings and the Attorney General's authority, it also recognized the limit to
those discretionary authorities. Therefore, the court held that aliens have
a fundamental right to be free from governmental detention unless a determination occurs that detention furthers a significant governmental interest. Moreover, the court recognized that detention could be justified
only by clear and convincing evidence that the arrestee presented an
identified and articulated threat to an individual or the community. The
Constitution secures the right to freedom and liberty in its enumerated
guarantee of habeas corpus through judicial scrutiny of the basis for governmental confinement.
The second issue was the juvenile status of the plaintiffs and its affect
on their liberties and the protections allotted to those liberties. The court
recognized that while a child accused of an offense may be subject to
pretrial detention based on a determination that release is not safe for
the child, such a determination has been held to meet the mandates of
due process only when made by a neutral and detached official, with the
justifications for detention clearly stated. The court concluded that minority status of plaintiffs cannot materially alter the nature of rights to
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which they are entitled.
The court finally turned to the issue concerning the governmental purpose for the blanket policy of detaining alien children pending deportation preceding. INS presented two reasons for the blanket detention of
those children. First, it suggested that the children's interest would be
better served by detention than by release to a responsible adult, whose
living environment the INS does not have the means to investigate. Second, it asserted that the policy is necessary to protect the agency from
potential liability in the event some harm should befall the children upon
their release to unrelated adults. The court rejected both arguments as
insufficient to support the infringement of liberties on a wide-scale basis.
While the court recognized the deference that governmental agencies
warrant in making determinations that relate to an area of their special
expertise, the court refused to recognize this deference in the present case
because the justifications asserted in this case dealt with the welfare of
children, an area in which INS, by its own admission, has no expertise.
With regard to the second justification-that release to unrelated adults
could subject INS to liability in the event harm befell the child-the
court could find little support for this potential liability. According to the
court, governmental agencies would face far greater exposure to liability
by maintaining a special custodial relationship than by releasing children
to reasonable adults and away from the constraints of governmental custody. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order requiring
the INS to hold a hearing to make the necessary determinations. The
determination at the hearing must include an inquiry into whether any
nonrelative who offers to take custody represents a danger to the child's
well being. The hearing is a reasonable procedure to protect the children
and provide the appropriate procedural safeguards for the deprivation at
issue. Significance-The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held a
blanket policy of detaining alien children who have no adult relative or

legal guardian to take their custody pending deportation proceedings to
be a violation of the fundamental right to challenge the deprivation of
liberty protected by the Constitution.
QUESTIONS

REGARDING

ORGANIZATIONS

WITH

WHICH APPLI-

CANTS FOR NATURALIZATION HAVE BEEN AFFILIATED, TO ASCERTAIN
ANY

RELATIONSHIP

WITH COMMUNIST-FRONT

ORGANIZATIONS,

IS

CONSISTENT WITH BOTH THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE'S AUTHORITY UNDER IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
ACT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION.

Price v. Immigration and NaturalizationService, 941 F.2d 878

860

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:857

(9th Cir. 1991).
The petitioner, John E. Price, is a citizen of the United Kingdom who
had resided in the United States under lawful resident alien status since
1960. On April 21, 1984, Price applied to petition for naturalization.
Price answered all questions on the application except Question 18,
which asked for a list of all present and past memberships in, or affiliations with, organizations and associations in the United States or abroad.
In an attached statement, he presented a legal brief contending that
Question 18 violated his First Amendment right of association. With regard to any past association with the Communist Party, the Communist
cause, or any organization or activity described in section 313 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a), Price responded negatively in all counts both in writing and during the preliminary examination. While Price later swore that he was not consciously
thinking of any organization, the knowledge of which he intended to
keep from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), he also
refused to respond orally to Question 18, beyond the fact that he did
participate in an organization. Price grounded his refusal upon the allegedly overbroad language of the question, which he contended violated his
First Amendment rights. Once his petition was denied, Price brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. On the basis of his refusal to answer Question 18, the district
court denied Price's petition for naturalization on the INS's recommendation. On appeal, Price argued that Question 18 exceeded the statutory
authority granted the Attorney General by Congress and that the question violated his First Amendment right to freedom of association. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Held: Affirmed.
The INS policy to ask applicants for naturalization to list their association with all organizations, to ascertain potential relationship with any
Communist-front organizations, is consistent with both the agency's authority under the INA and the First Amendment right to freedom of
association.
To be able to deny any association with organizations that advocate
opposition to organized government or the overthrow of the United
States government, the naturalization process requires applicants to an-

swer questions regarding their past affiliation with various groups. The
INA grants the Attorney General the authority to "prescribe the scope
and nature of the examination of petitioners for naturalization as to their
admissibility to citizenship." Within the limitations proscribed, the Attorney General has the authority to require applicants to aver to "all
facts which in the opinion of the Attorney General may be material to
the applicant's naturalization."
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Price argued that by listing in section 1424(a) certain types of organizations whose alien members or affiliates cannot be naturalized, Congress implicitly prohibited the Attorney General from denying naturalization on the basis of association with any other organization. Therefore,
he argued, the broad authority granted the Attorney General to inquire
into any matter "touching or in any way affecting" admissibility does not
include inquiry into any other types of organizations. The court, however, could find no support for the assumption that Congress intended
the list in section 1424(a) to be exclusive.
Instead, INS argued that limiting examination to asking petitioner
whether they are members of organizations of the type described in section 1424(a) would require the INS to rely on petitioners' own determinations whether particular organizations are of the prohibited type. The
court accepted this argument. The petitioner making those determinations, INS argued, could wrongfully believe that an organization with
which he had been affiliated does not fall within section 1424(a). Therefore, INS concluded that only by examining all organizations with which
the petitioner is affiliated can the Attorney General determine whether
the petitioner has been affiliated with one of the type listed in section
1424(a).
While the court did recognize that resident aliens enjoy the protections
of the First Amendment, it also recognized that the cases establishing
constitutional protection for aliens within the territory of the United
States have accorded those aliens different protections than to citizens of
the United States. Furthermore, the court recognized the historical deference Congress has enjoyed in the area of immigration and naturalization.
The INS relied on Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), for
the proposition that petitioner's First Amendment rights receive limited
judicial review at most. Price argued that because Kleindienst involved
exclusion rather than naturalization, its proposition could not control
here. The court, however, found the determination of who will become a
citizen of the United States at least as "peculiarly concerned with the
political conduct of government" as the decision of who will be allowed
to enter the United States. Therefore, naturalization decisions deserIve at
least as much judicial deference as decisions about initial admission.
Price then argued that while he did not challenge the political decision
underlying the determination of the substantive requirements for naturalization, he did challenge the method of inquiry, which, in the case of
Question 18, limited his right to free association. The court, however,
used similar arguments raised by the Supreme Court in Kleindienst to

reject the application of a greater judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, the application of the limited standard of review to the Attorney General's de-
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cision to ask Question 18 was appropriate because aliens have no right
to naturalization unless they comply with all the statutory requirements.
The court distinguished Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946),
from the present case because in Girouard the requirement involved
commitments that would last beyond naturalization, which natural-born
citizens could avoid based on their First Amendment rights. Signifcance-Because a petitioner might be mistaken about whether an organization is of the type prohibited by section 1424(a) and because the information required could reasonably reveal information relevant to other
requirements of naturalization, the question raised by the Attorney General does not violate the First Amendment to the Constitution or the
spirit of the act granting the Attorney General this authority.
II.

TAXATION AND FOREIGN COMMERCE

THE APPLICATION OF CALIFORNIA'S UNITARY TAX METHOD OF
WORLDWIDE COMBINED REPORTING TO DOMESTIC PARENT UNITARY
GROUPS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FOREIGN COMMERCE

THE

UNITED

STATES

CONSTITUTION.

CLAUSE IN

Colgate-Palmolive Co. v.

Franchise Tax Board, 284 Cal. Rptr. 3d 780 (1991).
California directed Colgate-Palmolive Company, Inc. (Colgate), a domestic-parent unitary group with approximately seventy-five foreign
subsidiaries operating in about fifty-four foreign states, to pay additional
taxes for the years 1970 through 1973 after California applied the
worldwide unitary tax method to the group. Under protest, Colgate paid
the additional taxes, and this action ensued. At trial, Colgate challenged
the federal constitutionality of the additional taxes on foreign commerce
clause grounds. The trial court agreed with Colgate's proposition that
the federal executive branch had acted decisively after Container Corp.
v. Franchise Tax Board, 436 U.S. 159 (1983), to communicate its longstanding position that California's worldwide unitary tax method impermissibly interfered with United States foreign policy. The Franchise Tax
Board (Board) appealed the trial court's decision to the California Court
of Appeals. Held: Reversed. The application of California's worldwide
unitary tax method to domestic parent unitary groups does not violate
the foreign commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
Two basic methods of income allocation exist for corporations that
conduct business across state or national boundaries: the arm's length or

separate accounting method, and the formulary apportionment or unitary business method. Under the arm's length method, the state treats
the related corporations of a multijurisdictional enterprise as distinct entities with separate taxable incomes. The state corrects improper shifting
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of value between the related corporations by requiring arm's length pricing in related corporate transactions. In other words, the related corporations. must act as if they were unrelated entities dealing at arm's length
in the marketplace. The unitary business or formulary apportionment
method, on the other hand, treats the related corporations of a multijurisdictional enterprise as units of a single business, in other words, a
unitary group. Based on tax policies of the jurisdiction implementing the
unitary business method, a proportion of the income associated with the
unitary group is then taxed in the given jurisdiction.
While the federal government has been devoted consistently to the
arm's length method, states like California have opted for the formulary
apportionment approach. Accordingly, if a corporation doing business in
California is deemed to be part of a unitary group, the group's total
worldwide income is apportioned to California by a three-factor formula.
Under the formula, the Board arithmetically compares the property,
payroll, and sales figures for the group in California to the property,
payroll, and sales figures for the group worldwide. The comparison will
produce an apportioned amount applied to the group's income to derive
the income taxable by California.
The court first reviewed the applicability of Wardair Canada v.
FloridaDept. of Revenue, 471 U.S. 1 (1986), as proposed by the Board
in support of precluding a dormant foreign commerce clause analysis.
The Board presented five matters under which an affirmative federal
policy presumably existed. The court, however, could discern no such
affirmative action in any of the five proposed matters. Therefore, the
court concluded that Wardair did not apply, buttressed by the fact that
the Container court had all of the significant factors upon which the
Board relied in the present case before it and nevertheless engaged in a
dormant foreign commerce clause analysis. Accordingly, the court proceeded with a foreign dormant commerce clause analysis and the application of the corresponding test created in Japan Line Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), and refined in Container.
Under the dormant foreign commerce clause test created in Japan
Line, a state taxation method is unconstitutional if it either creates a
"substantial risk of international multiple taxation" or "impair[s] federal
uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential" and prevents
"the federal government from 'speaking with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments.' " The court cited
Container, which involved the precise issue presented in the present
case: the constitutionality under the foreign commerce clause of the California worldwide unitary tax method as applied to a domestic parent
unitary group with foreign subsidiaries. Based on the analysis presented
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in Japan Line, the Court in Container held the tax method constitutional. According to the Court in Container,California's worldwide unitary tax method as applied to the domestic parent groups did not create
an "automatic 'asymmetry'" in international taxation, disadvantaging a
foreign entity. Furthermore, the Board applied the tax method to a domestic, rather than a foreign, corporation. And lastly, even if foreign
nations have a legitimate interest in reducing the tax burden of domestic
corporations, that burden results more from tax rate than allocation
method.
Colgate asserted that after Containerthe federal executive branch acted to communicate clearly its longstanding policy that states are not to
apply the world wide unitary method to any multinational corporation
because this application interferes with the federal government's conduct
of foreign policy and foreign affairs. To strengthen its proposition, Colgate introduced a number of statements and letters by numerous government officials as evidence of a government position opposed to the unitary tax method. While the court refused to discount the evidence
presented, it was not persuaded by its weight. One of the factors that
was most influential in the court's decision was the lack of an amicus
brief by the executive branch to indicate its position in the present case.
The Department of Justice response to Colgate's counsel was that it adheres to the position it took in Barklays Bank International Ltd. v.
Franchise Tax Board, 59 L.W. 2384 (Calif. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1990).

While in Barklays, the Department of Justice adhered to the arm's
length method as essential to avoiding adverse consequences for the foreign relations of the United States, the court in the present case distinguished Barklays based on the type of unitary group in question. While
in the present case the corporation subject to unitary taxation is a United
States parent corporation, in Barklays the corporation subject to the
same taxation was a foreign parent corporation with subsidiaries in the
United States. According to this court, while it is conceivable that a unitary taxation applied to a foreign parent corporation may conflict with
the foreign commerce clause, the application of the same to a United
States parent corporation cannot. Significance-Basedon the intentional
or unintentional failure by the executive branch of the federal government to make its position on the matter clear through an amicus brief,
the court has pursued a limited interpretation of the foreign commerce
clause to uphold the California worldwide unitary method, at least as
applied to domestic parent corporations.
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III.

AIR CARRIER LIABILITY-WARSAW CONVENTION

EMPLOYED MECHANICS WHO TRAVEL ABOARD PLANES AND MAINTAIN THEM IN PLACES WHERE THE CARRIER DOES NOT HAVE REGU-

Is NOT A "PASSENGER" WITHIN THE
17 OF WARSAW CONVENTION. Sulewski v. Federal Express Corp., 933 F.2d 180 (2nd Cir. 1991).
LAR MAINTENANCE,

CREW

MEANING OF ARTICLE

Leonard Sulewski, employed as an aircraft mechanic by the cargo carrier, Flying Tiger Line, Inc. (FTL), performed maintenance and repairs
on FTL airplanes. Contrary to its normal policy, FTL did not assign
Sulewski to any specific airport. FTL assigned him as a member of the
"Magnificent Seven" to specific flights that landed at airports where
FTL did not employ aircraft mechanics. Under the employment agreement, Sulewski was responsible for performing various duties associated
with certain flights prior to departure and upon landing at the flight's
destination. To perform these duties, Sulewski had to travel with the
plane to which he was assigned. Sulewski died in a crash in Kuala
Lumpur, while aboard his assigned plane. Sulewski's wife, Dolores,
brought an action against Federal Express Corporation, the successor-ininterest to FTL. Relying on the liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention (the Convention) and on common law negligence, she sought
compensatory damages for her husband's wrongful death. The court had
to determine whether an aircraft mechanic assigned to specific flights of
a cargo carrier to perform maintenance on the plane while it was at
airports at which the company had not maintained regular crews is a
"passenger" within the meaning of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
The district court decided that he was not a "passenger" within the
meaning of the Convention, and hence, granted Federal Express' motion
for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Held: Affirmed.
The material factual dispute in this case turned on the meaning of the
term "passenger" in the Convention. The text of the Convention eliminates several potential tests for determining the meaning of that term.
For instance, passenger status does not hinge on whether the person was
a fare-paying traveler. While article 1(1) states that the Convention shall
apply "to all international transportation of persons," both article 1(2)
and article 17 have limited the scope of the language surrounding passenger status. Given those limitations, the court concluded that the Convention does not cover the transportation of all persons, but only those
who board the plane pursuant to a contract of carriage. Furthermore,
article 17 requires the contract to have been made between the carrier
and a "passenger" for the Convention to apply.
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The court applied different techniques to determine the scope and nature of the term "passenger" as used in the Convention. Based on the
interpretations applied, the court concluded that as a matter of law
Sulewski was not a passenger aboard the flight in question. Because of
the nature of his services, Sulewski was also not a member of the flying
or operational crew. Because FTL assigned him to the flight and that
company policy, absent permission, prohibited mechanics like Sulewski
to fly on flights other than those assigned, the court's conclusion was
strengthened. While the court recognized that Sulewski performed the
bulk of responsibilities before and after the flight, the court refused to
apply a test that would hinge on this factor. An employee, such as
Sulewski, may be aboard a flight primarily to perform employment duties, even if those duties are limited necessarily to times immediately after the plane lands and before it takes off. Moreover, the court found it
sufficient that the employee was on call to perform employment services,
even if no such services occurred on the specific flight in question. Because Sulewski's primary purpose for being on the flight in question was
to facilitate the departure and arrival of the flight, in accordance with his
unique employment responsibilities, the court found sufficiently compelling evidence to rule as a matter of law that the mechanic was not a
"passenger" within the meaning of the Convention. Signiflcance-The

recent interpretations of the Warsaw Convention suggest a continued
trend towards the placement of further limitations on air carrier liabilities at the expense of the injured parties.

